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Abstract—An offline signature-based fuzzy vault (OSFV) is
a bio-cryptographic implementation that uses handwritten sig-
nature images as biometrics instead of traditional passwords
to secure private cryptographic keys. Having a reliable OSFV
implementation is the first step towards automating financial and
legal authentication processes, as it provides greater security of
confidential documents by means of the embedded handwritten
signatures. The authors have recently proposed the first OSFV
implementation which is reviewed in this paper. In this system, a
machine learning approach based on the dissimilarity representa-
tion concept is employed to select a reliable feature representation
adapted for the fuzzy vault scheme. Some variants of this system
are proposed for enhanced accuracy and security. In particular, a
new method that adapts user key size is presented. Performance
of proposed methods are compared using the Brazilian PUCPR
and GPDS signature databases and results indicate that the key-
size adaptation method achieves a good compromise between
security and accuracy. While average system entropy is increased
from 45-bits to about 51-bits, the AER (average error rate) is
decreased by about 21%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Automation of financial and legal processes requires en-
forcement of confidentiality and integrity of transactions. For
practical integration with the existing manual systems, such
enforcement should be transparent to users. For instance, a
person continually signs paper-based documents (e.g., bank
checks) by hand, while his embedded handwritten signature
images are used to secure the digitized version of the signed
documents.
Such scenario can be realizable using biometric cryp-
tosystems (also known as bio-cryptographic systems [1]) by
means of the offline handwritten signature images. In bio-
cryptography, biometric signals like fingerprints, iris, face or
signature images, etc., secure private keys within cryptography
schemes like digital signatures and encryption. Biometric sam-
ples provide a more trusted identification tool when compared
to simple passwords. For instance, a fingerprint is attached
to a person and it is harder to impersonate than traditional
passwords.
Despite its identification power, biometrics forms a chal-
lenging design problem due to its fuzzy nature. For instance,
while it is easy for a person to replicate his password during
authentication, it rarely happens that a person applies exact
fingerprint each time. The main source of variability in phys-
iological biometrics like fingerprint, face, iris, retina, etc. is
the imperfect acquisition of the traits. On the other hand,
behavioral biometrics like handwritten signatures, gait, and
even voice, have intrinsic variability that is harder to cancel.
Fuzzy vault (FV) is a reliable scheme presented mainly
to enable usage of fuzzy keys for cryptography [2]. A FV
decoder permits limited variations in the decryption key so that
secrets can be decrypted even with variable keys. Accordingly,
this scheme fits the bio-cryptography implementations, where
biometrics are considered as fuzzy keys by which private
cryptographic keys are secured. Since the FV scheme has
been proposed, it has being extensively employed for bio-
cryptography, where most implementations focused on phys-
iological biometrics, e.g., fingerprints [3], face [4] and iris
[5]. FV implementations based on the behavioral handwritten
signatures are few and mostly employed online signature traits,
where dynamic features like pressure and speed are acquired in
real time by means of special devices as electronic pens and
tablets [6]. Static offline signature images, that are scanned
after the signing process ends, however, integrate too much
variability to cancel by a FV decoder [7].
Recently, the authors have proposed the first offline
signature-based fuzzy vault (OSFV) implementation [8]-[12].
This implementation is employed to design a practical digital
signature system by means of handwritten signatures [13]. In
this paper, this implementation is reviewed and extended. In
particular, we propose an extension to enhance the security and
accuracy of the basic OSFV system by adapting cryptographic
key size for individual users. Finally, system performance on
the GPDS public signature database [14], besides the private
PUCPR Brazilian database [15], are presented and interpreted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, the OSFV implementation and its application
to produce digital signatures by means of the handwritten
signature images are reviewed. Section III describes the sig-
nature representation and lists some aspects for enhanced
representations. Section IV introduces some OSFV variants
for enhanced accuracy. Section V lists some variants for
enhanced security. The new variant that adapts key sizes for
enhanced security and accuracy is described in Section VI. The
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simulation results are presented in Section VII. Finally, some
research directions and conclusions are discussed in Section
VIII.
II. FUZZY VAULTS WITH SIGNATURE IMAGES
The system proposed for OSFV consists of two main sub-
systems: enrollment and authentication (see Figure 1). In
the enrollment phase, some signature templates {Ts}Ss=1 are
collected from the enrolling user. These templates are used
for the user representation selection, as described in Section
III. The user representation selection process results in a user
representations matrix UR = (FI, V I,∆), where FI =
{fIi}ti=1 is the vector of indexes of the selected features,
V I = {vIi}ti=1 is a vector of indexes mapping represented
in l/2-bits1 , and ∆ = {δi}ti=1 is the vector of expected
variabilities associated with the selected features. This matrix
is user specific and contains important information needed for
the authentication phase. Accordingly, UR is encrypted by
means of a user password PW . Both FV and password are
then stored as a part of user bio-cryptography template (BCT ).
Then, the user parameters FI and V I are used to lock the user
cryptography key K by means of a single signature template
Ts in a fuzzy vault FV .
In the authentication phase, user password PW is used
to decrypt the matrix UR. Then, the vectors FI, V I and ∆
are used to decode the FV by means of user query signature
sample Q. Finally, user cryptographic key K is released to the
user so he can use it to decrypt some confidential information
or digitally signs some documents.
A. Enrollment process
The enrollment sub-system uses the user templates {Ts}Ss=1,
the password PW , and the cryptography key K to generate
a bio-cryptography template (BCT) that consists of the fuzzy
vault FV and the encrypted user representation matrix EUR.
The user representation selection module generates the UR
matrix as described in Section III.
The OSFV encoding module (illustrated in Figure 2) de-
scribes the following processing steps:
1) the virtual indexes V I = {vIi}ti=1 are quantized in l/2-
bits and produces a vector XT = {xTi }ti=1.
2) the user feature indexes FI = {fi}ti=1 are used to
extract feature representation FT = {fTi }ti=1 from the
signature template Ts. This representation is then quan-
tized in l/2-bits and produces a vector Y T = {yTi }ti=1.
3) The features are encoded to produce the locking set
A = {ai}ti=1, where A = XT ||Y T consists of l-bits
FV points 2.
4) the cryptography key K of size KS where:
KS = l(k + 1)− bits (1)
1As will be described later in this section, a feature index and its value are
quantized in l/2-bits each and then they are concatenated to produce a FV
element of l − bits size. Since a feature index fi might not fit in l/2-bits,
we map it in a virtual index vi of a condensed size.
2FV points are represented with fixed quantization sizes since FV decoders
rely on error-correction codes that employ finite (Galois) field computations.
is split into k+1 parts of l-bits each 3 , that constitutes a
coefficient vector C = {c0, c1, c2, ...., ck}. A polynomial
p of degree k is encoded using C, where p(x) = ckxk+
ck−1ck−1 + .....+ c1x+ c0.
5) the polynomial is evaluated for all points in A = {ai}ti=1
and constitutes the set p(A) = {p(ai)}ti=1 where
p(ai) = ckai
k + ck−1aik−1 + .....+ c1ai + c0.
6) chaff (noise) points (Aˆ = {aˆii}rii=t+1, Pˆ =
{pˆii)}rii=t+1) are generated, where aˆii ∈ GF (2l), aˆii 6=
ai ∨ ii ∈ [t + 1, r], i ∈ [1, t], and pˆii ∈ GF (2l), pˆii 6=
p(aˆii) ∨ ii ∈ [t + 1, r]. A chaff point aˆii = xii||yii is
composed of two parts: the index part xii and the value
part yii. Two groups of chaff points are generated. Chaffs
of G1 have their indexes equal to the indexes of the
genuine points. The chaff points and the genuine point
that have the same index part are all equally spaced by
a distance Ω, eliminating the possibility to differentiate
between the chaffs and the genuine point. Chaffs of G2
have their index part differs than that of the genuine
points 4. As the number of chaffs in G1 is limited by
the parameters t and Ω, so to inject higher quantity of
chaffs we define α as a chaff groups ratio, where:
α = g2/g1 (2)
where g1 and g2 are the amount of chaff features belong
to G1 and G2, respectively. G2 chaffs are generated with
αt indexes different than the t genuine indexes. Hence,
the FV size r is given by:
r = t(α+ 1)/Ω (3)
So, the total number of chaffs z is given by:
z = t(α+ 1− Ω)/Ω (4)
7) the genuine set (A, p(A)), and the chaff set (Aˆ, Pˆ ) are
merged to constitute the fuzzy vault FV = (A˜, P˜ ),
where A˜ = A
⋃
Aˆ, A = {ai}ti=1, Aˆ = {aˆi}ri=t+1 and
P˜ = p(A)
⋃
Pˆ , p(A) = {p(ai)}ti=1, Pˆ = {pˆi}ri=t+1.
B. Authentication Process
The authentication sub-system uses the user query sample
Q and the password PW , to decode the fuzzy vault FV and
restore the user cryptography key K. First the password PW
is used to decrypt the UR matrix. Then the vectors FI, V I ,
and ∆ are used to decode the FV by means of the query Q.
The OSFV decoding module (illustrated in Figure 3) de-
scribes the following processing steps:
1) the virtual indexes V I = {vIi}ti=1 are quantized in l/2-
bits and produces a vector XQ = {xQi }ti=1.
3The FV quantization size l is set to 16-bits in this work. So cryptographic
keys of size KS = 128-bits are encoded suing polynomials of degree k = 7
4The user password protects the UR that stores his feature representation
model. If the attacker compromised the password, the indexes of the genuine
points are known to him. In such case, chaffs of G2 are filtered out while
G1 could not be filtered without applying the good features.
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Fig. 2. Block diagram of the OSFV encoding process [10]. The bold lines highlight the modules where specific modifications apply to the standard encoding
process employed in the literature of biometric FVs, e.g., [3].
2) the user feature indexes FI = {fi}ti=1 are used to
extract feature representation FQ = {fQi }ti=1 from Q.
This representation is then quantized in l/2-bits and
produces a vector Y Q = {yQi }ti=1.
3) The features are encoded to produce the unlocking
set B = {bi}ti=1, where B = XQ||Y Q. Hence, the
unlocking elements are represented in a field GF (2l).
4) the unlocking set B is used to filter the chaff points
from the FV. An adaptive matching method is applied
to match unlocking and locking points. Items of B are
matched against all items in A˜. This process results in a
matching set (A¯, P¯ ) = ((B
⋂
A˜), p← (B⋂ A˜)), where
p← (B⋂ A˜) represents the projection of the matching
features on the polynomial space. Chaff filtering is done
as follows. If the feature indexes are correct 5 , then
all elements of XQ will have corresponding elements in
XT . So, all of chaffs of G2 will be filtered out. Then,
each of the remaining FV points will be compared to
corresponding points extracted from the query sample.
An adaptive matching method is applied: for every
feature i, a matching window wi is adapted to the feature
5That occurs if the applied password is genuine, so the UR is decrypted
properly and the right indexes are restored.
modeled variability δi, where wi = 2δi. A FV point ai is
considered matching with an unlocking point bi, if they
reside in the same matching window. I.e., |ai−bi| ≤ wi.
5) the matching set (A¯, P¯ ) is used to reconstruct a poly-
nomial p′ of degree k by applying the RS decoding
algorithm [16].
6) the coefficients of p′ are assembled to constitute the
secret cryptography key K ′.
C. Applications
In [13], the OSFV implementation is employed to produce
digital signatures using offline handwritten signatures. This
methodology facilitates the automation of business processes,
where users continually employ their handwritten signatures
for authentication. Users are isolated from the details related to
the generation of digital signatures, yet benefit from enhanced
security.
Figure 4 illustrates the OSFV-based digital signature frame-
work. The user FV that is constructed during enrollment is
used to sign user documents offline as follows. When a user
signs a document by hand, his handwritten signature image
is employed to unlock his private key d
′
. The unlocked key
produces a digital signature by encrypting some message
m extracted from the document (e.g., check amount). The
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encrypted message is considered as a digital signature and it is
attached to the digitized document. Any party who possesses
the user public key can verify the digital signature, where
verification of the digital signature implies authenticity of the
manuscript signature and integrity of the signed document
(e.g., check amount did not change).
III. FEATURE REPRESENTATION
According to aforementioned OSFV implementation, the
FV points encode some features extracted from the signature
images. It is obvious that accuracy of a FV system relies on
the feature representation. Representations of intra-personal
signatures should sufficiently overlap so that matching errors
lie within the error correction capacity of the FV decoder. On
contrary, representations of inter-personal signatures should
sufficiently differ so that matching errors are higher than the
error correction capacity of the FV decoder.
Accordingly, the authors proposed to design signature rep-
resentations adapted for the FV scheme by applying a feature
selection process in a feature-dissimilarity space. In this space,
features are extracted from each pair of template and query
δ1
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Fig. 5. Illustration of the feature representation designing process [10].
samples and the pair-wise feature distances are used as space
dimensions.
To illustrate this approach, see Figure 5. In this example,
three signature images are represented: T is the template
signature, Q1 is a genuine query sample and Q2 is a forgery
fQ1 = f
T
1
2
‖ fQ2 − f T2 ‖< δ2
3
p( f T1 ) = p← fQ1
p( f )
f
mw2 = 2δ2
p( f T2 ) = p← fQ2
p( f T3 ) = p← fQ3
‖ fQ3 − f T3 ‖< δ3
mw3 = 2δ3
Ω3 = 3δ3
1
Fig. 6. Illustration of adaptive matching and adaptive chaff generation methods [11].
query sample. In the left side, signatures are represented in the
FV feature encoding space, where a FV point encodes a feature
index i and its value fi. For simplicity, only two features (f1
and f2) are shown, while the full representation consists of t
dimensions. On the right side, signatures are represented in the
feature dissimilarity space. In this space, a feature is replaced
by its distance from a reference value. For instance, f1 and
f2 are replaced by their dissimilarity representations δf1, δf2,
where δf1 = |fQ1 − fT1 |, and δf2 = |fQ2 − fT2 |. Accordingly,
while a point in the feature encoding space represents a
signature image, a point in the feature dissimilarity space
represents the dissimilarity between two different signature
images. The point dQ1 represents the dissimilarity between
the genuine signature Q1 and the template T , and a point dQ2
represents the dissimilarity between the forgery signature Q2
and the template T , where dQ1= (δfQ11 , δf
Q1
2 , ....., δf
Q1
t ), and
dQ2= (δfQ21 , δf
Q2
2 , ....., δf
Q2
t ).
In this example, δf1 and δf2 are discriminant features. For
instance, for all genuine query samples like Q1, δf
Q1
i < δi and
for all forgery query samples like Q2, δf
Q2
i > δi. Unfolding
these discriminant dissimilarity features to the original feature
encoding space produces discriminant features in the encod-
ing feature space, where the distance between two feature
instances is used to determine their similarity. For instance,
a genuine feature (like fQ1i ) lies close to the template feature
fTi , so they are similar, where closeness here implies that both
features reside in a matching window wi = 2δi. Features
extracted from a forgery image (like fQ2i ) do not resemble
the template feature fTi , as they reside outside the matching
window wi.
Aforementioned description of the process to design rep-
resentations is generic. Some extensions are reviewed and
compared below.
A. Global VS Local Representations
Shortage of user samples for training is addressed by
designing a global writer-independent (WI) representation [8].
A large number of signature images from a development
database are represented in the feature-dissimilarity space of
high dimensionality, and feature selection process runs to
produce a global space of reduced dimensionality. Such global
approach permits designing FV systems for any user even who
provides a single signature sample during enrollment.
For performance improvement, the global representation is
specified for individual users once enough number of enrolling
samples becomes available. To this end, training samples are
firstly represented in the global representation space, then
an additional training step runs to produce a local writer-
dependent (WD) representation that discriminates the specific
user from others. Simulation results have shown that local
representations enhanced FV decoding accuracy by about
30%, where the average error rate (AER) is decreased from
25% in case of global representations to 17.75% for the local
ones.
B. Multi-Scale Feature fusion
In [8], the Extended Shadow Code (ESC) feature extraction
method is adapted for the FV implementation [18]. These
features consist in the superposition of a bar mask array over a
binary image of handwritten signatures. Each bar is assumed to
be a light detector related to a spatially constrained area of the
2D signal. This method is powerful in detecting various levels
of details in the signature images by varying the extraction
scale. For instance, an image could be split to h × v of
horizontal and vertical cells, respectively, and shadow codes
are extracted within individual cells. The higher the number
of cells, the higher the resolution of detectors.
The authors observed that designing FVs based on a single
extraction scale results in varying performance for the different
users. For instance, while high resolution scales are fine
with users whose signatures are easy to forge or those who
have high similarities with others, the low resolutions are
better for users whose signatures integrate high variabilities.
Accordingly, a multi-scale feature fusion method is proposed,
where different feature vectors are extracted based on different
extraction scales and they are combined to produce a high-
dimensional representation. This representation is then pro-
cessed through the WI and WD design phased and produces
the final local representation that encodes in the FV.
C. Multi-Type Feature fusion
Besides fusing feature vectors that are extracted based on
different scales, it is possible to fuse different types of features.
In [11], the directional probability density function (DPDF)
features [19] are fused with ESC features to constitute a huge
dimensional representation (of 30,201 dimensionality). This
representation is reduced through the WI and WD training
steps and produced a concise representation of only 20 fea-
tures. It is shown that injecting the additional feature type
increased the FV decoding accuracy by about 22% (AER is
reduced from 17.75% to 13.75%).
D. Prototype Selection
The aforementioned approach provides a practical scenario
to produce representations with low intra-personal and high
inter-personal variabilities which is mandatory feature for
FV systems. However, the authors observed that the margin
between the intra and the inter classes differs when using
different signature prototypes (templates) for FV encoding.
Accordingly, a prototype selection method is proposed [9].
The WD representation is projected to a dissimilarity space
where distances to different user prototypes are the space
constituents. Then, a feature selection process runs in the
dissimilarity space and locates the best prototype. This method
has enlarged the separation between the intra and inter clusters
significantly (Area under ROC curve (AUC) is increased from
0.93 to 0.97).
IV. EXTENSIONS FOR ENHANCED ACCURACY
Although accuracy of an OSFV system relies mainly on
quality of the feature representation, the proposed implemen-
tation provides additional opportunities for enhanced accuracy
by applying some other design variants as described in this
section.
A. Adaptive Matching
The results mentioned so far report accuracy of FV de-
coders that apply strict matching approach. Two FV points
are matching only if they have identical values. Accuracy of
a FV decoder is enhanced by applying the adaptive matching
method, where the feature variability matrix ∆ is used for
matching so that corresponding FV points are considered
matching if their difference lies within the expected variability
of their encoding feature (see Figure 6). This method increased
accuracy by about 27% (AER is reduced from 13.75% to
10.08%) [10].
B. Ensemble of Fuzzy Vaults
Instead of decoding a single FV token, it is possible to
decode several FVs for enhanced performance. In case that
some FVs are correctly decoded, the decrypted key is released
to the user based on the majority vote rule. This method has
increased detection accuracy by about 18% (AER is reduced
from 10.08% to 8.21%) [10].
C. Additional Passwords
The limited discriminative power of FVs is alleviated by
using an additional password PW , so that the false accept rate
(FAR) is reduced without significantly affecting the false reject
rate (FRR). For the results reported so far, it was assumed that
the user password PW is compromised. However, to report
the actual performance of the system we have to consider the
case when an attacker neither possesses a correct password nor
a genuine signature sample. In this case, he cannot decrypt
the UR model and hence he randomly guesses the feature
indexes. It is shown that the additional password has increased
detection accuracy by about 65% (AER is reduced from 8.21%
to 2.88%) [10].
D. Cascading With Traditional SV Modules
Using additional passwords for enhanced system accuracy
comes with the expense of the user inconvenience. In [12], a
novel user-convenient approach is proposed for enhancing the
accuracy of signature-based biometric cryptosystems. Since
signature verification (SV) systems designed in the original
feature space have demonstrated higher discriminative power
to detect impostors [20], they can be used to improve the FV
systems. Instead of using an additional password, the same
signature sample is processed by a SV classifier before triggers
the FV decoders (see Figure 7). Using this cascaded approach,
the high FAR of FV decoders is alleviated by the higher
capacity of SV classifiers to detect impostors. This method has
increased detection accuracy by about 35% (AER is reduced
from 10.08% to 6.55%). When multiple FVs are fused, the
AER is decreased by 31.30% (from 8.21% to 5.64%).
V. EXTENSIONS FOR ENHANCED SECURITY
Security of the OSFV implementation is analyzed in terms
of the brute-force attack [10]. Assume an attacker could
compromise the FV without possessing neither valid password
nor genuine signature sample. In this case, the attacker tries
to separate enough number of genuine points (k+ 1) from the
chaff points. Security of a FV is given by:
security ∼=
(
(α+ 1)t
k + 1
)
(1/Ω)k+1 (5)
Where α is the chaff group ratio, t is the number of genuine
points in the FV, k is the degree of the encoding polynomial
and Ω is the chaff separation distance.
High value of α implies a high number of G2 features which
are compromised in case that the password is compromised.
The parameter t should be concise as it impacts the accuracy
and complexity of the FV. Accordingly, entropy of the system
SV
F¯Q SV (Q)
1, SV1, FV1
2, SV2, FV2
.
.
id, SVid, FV3
id
SVid
Feature
Extraction
Q FV TRFQ
FV TR(Q)
FVid
Feature
Extraction
FV T2
FV T2(Q)
FV T1
FV T1(Q)
MV
FV (Q)
Q
SV Module FV Module
System DB
K
Fig. 7. Cascaded SV-FV system in the verification mode: different feature representations F¯ and F are processed by a SV classifier and a set of FV decoders,
respectively. The FV module is triggered only if the SV module produces a positive classification label [12].
can be increased through using different values of the param-
eters: Ω and k. However, there is a trade-off between system
security and its recognition accuracy that could be alleviated
by applying the following approaches.
A. Adaptive Chaff Generation
In the traditional chaff generation method, equal-spaced
chaff points are generated with a separation factor Ω [10]. In
such case, there is a trade-off between security and robustness.
For instance, with small separation, e.g., Ω = 0.025, there are
40 FV points generated with the same index (1 genuine + 39
chaff points). In this case, a high number of chaffs is generated
and results in high system entropy of about 68-bits and low
accuracy of about 20% AER.
The adaptive chaff generation method enables the injection
of high number of chaff with minimal impact on the FV
decoding robustness. To this end, the feature variability vector
∆ is used during the FV locking phase so that chaff points are
generated adaptively according to feature variability. For each
feature fi , Ωi = 3× δi (see Figure 6). By this method, it is
less likely that an unlocking element equates a chaff element.
For or instance, the same entropy (68-bits) could be achieved
with a minimal impact on system robustness (AER = 10.52%)
[11].
B. Controlling Key Size
According to Eq.5, the longer the cryptographic key size the
higher entropy of the FV. However, this comes with expense
of the accuracy [10]. In [13], different key sizes (KS) are tried
(128, 256, 512, 1024-bits) and it is shown that different key
sizes result in different performance for the different users.
This observation motivates adapting the key length for each
user as proposed in the following section,
VI. THE ADAPTIVE KEY SIZE APPROACH
In [11], functionality of a FV decoder is formulated as a
simple dissimilarity threshold as follows:
FV T (Q) = sign(− (δQTA + δ
′
)). (6)
Where a FV encoded by a template T can be correctly
decoded by a query Q only if the total dissimilarity between
Q and T is less than the error correction capacity  of the
FV decoder. Here, δQTA is the dissimilarity part that results
from the variability between the two samples, and δ
′
is the
dissimilarity part that results from wrong matches with chaff
points.
The methods discussed so far aimed to optimize the dissim-
ilarity parts of Eq.6. For instance, the multi-scale and multi-
type feature extraction approach results in separating intra-
personal and inter-personal dissimilarity ranges. Selection of
robust templates (prototypes) and applying adaptive matching
enlarged this separation. Also, impact of the chaff error is
minimized by presenting the adaptive chaff method. With
applying all these methods, however, accuracy of a signature-
based FV is still below the level required for practical ap-
plications. Accordingly, performance is increased by applying
some complex and user inconvenient solutions like ensemble
of FVs and using additional passwords or cascading SV and
FV systems.
Here we investigate a new room for enhancing FVs by
optimizing the error correction capacity ε which is given by:
ε = (t− k − 1)/2 (7)
It is obvious that this parameter relies on the FV encoding
size t and the encoding polynomial degree k. Also, from Eq.1,
we see that k determines the key size KS. Accordingly, we
select user specific key sizes through changing the parameter
k so that ε for a specific user covers the range of his expected
signature variability. To this end, we set ε for a user to his
maximum intra-personal variability e. Based on the resulting
user-specific error correction capacity, the parameter k is
determined using Eq.7 and user key size KS is computed
using Eq.16 .
Once appropriate key size is computed for a user, his key
is enlarged through injecting some padding bits in the original
key during FV encoding. During authentication, the enlarged
key is reconstructed and the padding bits are removed to
produce the original cryptographic key.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
All aforementioned performance results are reported for the
PUCPR Brazilian signature database [15]. Here we test the
system for the public GPDS-300 database [14] as well. This
database contains signatures of 300 users, that were digitized
as 8-bit greyscale at resolution of 300 dpi and contains images
of different sizes (that vary from 51× 82 pixels to 402× 649
pixels). All users have 24 genuine signatures and 30 simulated
forgeries. It is split into two parts. The first part contains
signatures of the first 160 users. A subset of this part is
used to design the local representation and the remaining of
this part is used for performance evaluation. The second part
contains signatures of the last 140 users and it is used to design
the global representation. See [20] for a similar experimental
protocol for both databases.
Table I shows results for the two databases for fixed and
adaptive key sizes. It is obvious that employing the adaptive
key size approach decreased the FAR significantly with low
impact on the FRR. For instance, the AER for the PUCPR
database in decreased by about 21% (from 10.08 to 7.94).
Also, performance of the system for the GPDS database is
comparable to state-of-the-art traditional SV systems (AER is
about 15%) that employ more complex classifiers [20].
Moreover, the proposed method also enhances system se-
curity as it is possible to increase the key size, and hence the
polynomial degree k, without much impact on the accuracy.
For instance, Figure 8 shows the adapted polynomial degrees
for different users in the PUCPR database and the correspond-
ing user variability e. It is obvious that users with more stable
signatures have their cryptographic keys more enlarged than
users with less stable signatures. According to Eq.5, system
entropy of the standard OSFV implementation (with fixed keys
of size 128-bits and polynomial degree k = 7) is about 45-
bits. With applying the adaptive key size method, the average
k is about 9.6-bits (see Figure 8) which provides an average
entropy of about 51-bits.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this paper, a recently published offline signature-based
FV implementation is reviewed. Several variants of the system
are listed and compared for enhanced accuracy and security.
A novel method to adapt cryptography key sizes for different
users is proposed and have shown accuracy and security
6In this work, we set an upper limit for the error correction capacity to be
ε ≤ 6 so that k ≥ 7 and KS ≥ 128-bits.
TABLE I
IMPACT OF USING A USER PASSWORD AS A SECOND AUTHENTICATION
MEASURE
Measure PUCPR DB GPDS DBFixed Key Adaptive Key Fixed Key Adaptive Key
FRR 11.53 12.71 37.5 39.07
FARrandom 2.05 0 0 0
FARsimple 2.39 0.05 - -
FARsimulated 24.28 19.02 15.37 11.20
AERall 10.08 7.94 17.6 16.75
Fig. 8. Adaptive polynomial degree (k) VS Intra-personal variability (e)
enhancement. The performance is also validated on a public
signature database where comparable results of complex SV in
the literature is reported. Although the proposed key adaptation
method sounds, there is need to propose more intelligent
tuning technique taking in consideration the similarities with
simulated forgeries for higher forgery detection. This study
listed many new approaches that are applied successfully to
the signature based bio-cryptography. We believe that these
methods shall be investigated for other biometrics which might
enhance state-of-the-art of the area of bio-cryptosystems.
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